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Buchanan, J. M.
Buchanan, James M.
Buchanan, James MacGill
Buchanan, James Mcgill
Buchanan, James McGill (Jr)
writer of accompanying material
Akerlof, George A.
Barbosa, Antonio S Pinto
Brennan, Geoffrey (1944-)
Brennan, H. Geoffrey
Buchanan, J M
Buchanan, J. M.
Buchanan, James M
Buchanan, James M.
Bush, Winston C
Canada. Forest Industries Advisory Committee
Congleton, Roger D
Congleton, Roger D.
Faith, Roger L
Faith, Roger L.
Flowers, Marilyn R.
Goetz, Charles J
Goetz, Charles J.
Hemphill, C. Scott
Koslowski, Peter (1952-)
Lee, Dwight R
Musgrave, Richard A.
Stubblebine, W C
Thirlby, G. F.
Tollison, Robert D
Tollison, Robert D.
Tullock, Gordon (1922-....))
University of Chicago, Department of Economics
Vanberg, Viktor J
Vanberg, Viktor J.
Varian, Hal R.
Wagner, Richard E.
Wagner, Richard E. (1941-....))
Yoon, Yong J
Yoon, Yong J.
Afraid to be free: Dependency as desideratum
Agreement and efficiency: response to Guttman
Albert Breton, Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance.
All voting is strategic
Backbending Supply Curve of Labor: An Example of Doctrinal Retrogression?, The
Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments., The
balanced budget amendment, The : Clarifying the arguments
Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem.
Bibliography of James M. Buchanan's Publications, 1949-1986.
Buchanan on Heraclitian Vespers
Calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy
Cartels, coalitions, and constitutional politics
Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action
Confessions of a Burden Monger
Constitution of Economic Policy., The
Constitutional implications of alternative models of increasing returns
Constitutional Implications of Radical Subjectivism.
Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory., A
Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation.
Convexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory.
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998: An Economic Analysis, The
Correction in Elementary Public Choice Geometry., A
Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government. By Robert Higgs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. xix, 350. $24.95.
CRITERIA FOR GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: COMMENT
Dialogues concerning fiscal religion
did not call him “Fritz”: Personal recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek, I
Direct Democracy, Classical Liberalism, and Constitutional Strategy.
domain of constitutional economics, The
Economic Science and Cultural Diversity.
Economic Science in the Future
Economics and Ethics of Idleness, The
Economics in the Post-Socialist Century.
Economics of Earmarked Taxes, The
Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare, Robert Sugden. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, vii + 191 pages., The
Economists Have No Clothes
Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal Equalization, An
Efficiency limits of fiscal mobility: An assessment of the tiebout model
Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities.
Erratum to: Lagged implementation as an element in constitutional strategy
Ethical Limits of Taxation., The
Europe as social reality
Evaluation of Public Services, The
External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure.
External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply: Reply.
Federal Grants and Resource Allocation: A Reply
Fiscal equity in a federal state
Fiscal Equity in the Unequal Treatment of Unequals: A Rejoinder
Game theory, mathematics, and economics
Generalized Increasing Returns, Euler's Theorem, and Competitive Equilibrium
Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle., A
Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs: Reply., The
How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?
ICONS OF PUBLIC DEBT, THE
Ideas, institutions, and political economy: A plea for disestablishment
In search of homunculus politicus
Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators., The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective: Comment., The
Individual Choice in Voting and the Market
Jack Wiseman: A personal appreciation
Justice among Natural Equals: Memorial Marker for John Rawls.
Lagged implementation as an element in constitutional strategy
LET US UNDERSTAND ADAM SMITH
Limits of Market Efficiency, The
Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers
Majoritarian Management of the Commons.
Market as a Creative Process, The
Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals.
metamorphosis of John Gray, The
Moral Dimension of Debt Financing., The
most significant contributions to economics during the twentieth century: lists of the Nobel laureates, The
NATURAL EQUALITY, INCREASING RETURNS, AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS: A REINTERPRETATION OF ADAM SMITH'S SYSTEM
normative purpose of economic "science": Rediscovery of an eighteenth century method, The
Notes on Nobelity
Obituary: The Sayer of Truth: A Personal Tribute to Peter Bauer.
On Monopoly Price: Reply.
Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt.
Pareto-Optimality and Gains-from-Trade: A Comment.
Pareto Superior Tax Reform: Some Simple Analytics
political ambiguity of Reagan economics, The : Marginal adjustment or structural shift?
Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution.
Political Economy and National Priorities: A Review Essay of the Economic Report of the President and the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers.
Political Philosophy, Jean Hampton. Westview Press, 1997, xiii + 272 pages.
Politics as Tragedy in Several Acts
Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene.
Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve.
Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Control versus Taxes: Reply.
Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes.
Power to Tax, The
Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes.
Private Interest Support for Efficiency Enhancing Antitrust Policies.
PROFESSOR MAXWELL AND FISCAL EQUITY
Public choice after socialism
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
Public Choice and the Extent of the Market
Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State
Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach, The
Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules
Reason of Rules, The
Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession.
Revenue Implications of Money Creation under Leviathan.
Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics
Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit.
Smithean Perspective on Increasing Returns, A
Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets
Status of the Status Quo, The
Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Contractual Agreement on Distributional Rules.
Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons.
Tax instruments as constraints on the disposition of public revenues
Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics.
Tax Reform as Political Choice.
Taxation in fiscal exchange
theory of leadership and deference in constitutional construction, A
Theory of Truth in Autobiography., A
Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan
Towards the Simple Economics of Natural Liberty: An Exploratory Analysis.
Trying again to value a life
V. Ostrom, The meaning of democracy and the vulnerability of democracies : A response to Tocqueville's challenge
Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting: Reply.
Who Should Pay for Common-Access Facilities?
Contributed to or performed:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Economics