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Person
ISNI: 
0000 0001 0859 0760
Name: 
Levine, D. K.
Levine, David
Levine, David K.
Levine, David Knudsen
レヴァイン, デヴィッド・K
Dates: 
1955-
Creation class: 
article
Computer file
cre
Language material
Text
txt
Creation role: 
author
contributor
editor
redactor
Related names: 
Backus, David
Blanco, Herminio
Boldrin, Michele
Boldrin, Michele (1956-)
Cappelli, Peter
Celentani, Marco
Celentani, Marco et al
Chowdhry, Bhagwan
David, Levine K.
Dekel, E
Dekel, E.
Dekel, Eddie
Drew, Fudenberg
ebrary, Inc
Ely, Jeffery
Ely, Jeffrey
Federal Reserve Bank Affiliation (see also from)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis / Research Division
Foster, Dean
Fudenberg, D
FUDENBERG, D.
Fudenberg, Drew
Grinblatt, Mark
Herrera, Helios
Holmes, Thomas J.
James A. Schmitz, Jr
Johnson, Philip
Johnson, Phillip
Kehoe, T. J.
Kehoe, Timothy J
Kehoe, Timothy J.
Kreps, David
Kreps, David M.
Levine, D-K
Levine, D.
Levine, D. K.
Levine, D.K.
Levine, David
Levine, David Andrew
Levine, David I
Levine, David I.
Levine, David K
Levine, David K.
Levine, Robert
Lippman, Steven A.
Martinelli, César
Mas-Colell, Andreu
MASKIN, E.
Maskin, Eric
O'Shaughnessy, K.C.
Palfrey, Thomas
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
Prescott, Edward
Prescott, Edward C.
Rolnick, Arthur
Romer, Paul
Romer, Paul M
Romer, Paul M.
Rustichini, Aldo
Ruud, Paul
Schmitz, James A.
Schmitz, James Andrew
Shell, Karl
Szentes, B.
Szentes, Balázs
Takahashi, Satoru
Tirole, Jean
University of California Affiliation (see also from)
Vohra, Rakesh
Washington University Affiliation (see also from)
Washington University in St. Louis / Department of Economics
Zame, William
Zame, William R
Zame, William R.
山形, 浩生 (1964-)
Titles: 
Against intellectual monopoly, 2008:
approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information, An
APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION., AN
Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information
Bankruptcy and collateral in debt constrained markets
Can a Turing Player identify itself?.
case against intellectual property, The
Castle on the Hill, The
Changes in Managerial Pay Structures 1986-1992 and Rising Returns to Skill
Comments on Bruce Smith’s work
Comparative statics and perfect ... 1982
Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies.
Conditional Universal Consistency
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Consistency and cautious fictitious play
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"
Debt-Constrained Asset Markets.
Debt constraints and equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets
Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with Finitely Many Consumers
Determinacy of equilibrium in large-scale economies
Determinacy of Equilibrium in Large Square Economies
DETERRENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND THE 'WAR ON TERROR'
Does Market Incompleteness Matter?
Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, A
Easier Way to Calibrate, An
EconomicDynamics Interviews David Levine on Experimental Economics
economics of ideas and intellectual property, The
economics of indeterminacy in overlapping generations models, The
economics of information, 1995:, The
Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning, An
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players.
Efficiency and the Value of Money.
Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly I: Equilibrium, The
Enforcement of Collusion in a Frictionless Oligopoly II: Stability, The
Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly, The
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
¿Está la economía del comportamiento condenada a desaparecer? Lo ordinario frente a lo extraordinario
Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game
Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
evolution of cooperation through imitation, The
Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population
Extrapolative Investment Equilibrium
Factor saving innovation
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems
Farm Size and Reaper Diffusion in the Antebellum Midwest
Financial Sector in the Planning of Economic Development, The
Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information., The
FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION., THE
Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity
Gross substitutability in large-square economies
Gross Substitutes in Large Square Economics
Growth and intellectual property
Growth cycles and market crashes
Han chiteki dokusen : Tokkyo to chosakuken no keizaigaku
IER Lawrence Klein lecture the case against intellectual monopoly
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities.
Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models
Indeterminacy of Relative Prices in Overlapping Generations Models
Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information
Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities
Information aggregation, security design and currency swaps
Intellectual property and market size
Intertemporal separability in overlapping-generations models
Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue
Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell
Introduction to the Special Issue
Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?: The Ordinary versus the Extraordinary
Learning and Equilibrium
Learning in games
Learning in the Stock Flow Model
Learning to play Bayesian games
Limit games and limit equilibria
Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets.
Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets
Local Almost Perfect Equilibrium with Large Adjustment Costs*
long-run collaboration on long-run games, A
Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints
Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent.
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games.
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE.
Monopoly and the incentive to innovate when adoption involves switchover disruptions
Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria
Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games, The
Neuroeconomics?
Notes on Discrete Dynamic Programming
On Characterizing Equilibria of Economies with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems.
On Characterizing Equilibria of Models with Externalities and Taxes as Solutions to Optimization Problems
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players
Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study, A
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium.
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
Perfectly competitive innovation
Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation
Production chains
Regularity in overlapping generations exchange economies
remark on serial correlation in maximum likelihood, A
Rent-seeking and innovation
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals
Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player.
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment
Reverse regression for latent-variable models
Reverse Regressions for Latent Variable Models
Risk Sharing and Market Incompleteness
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
sensitivity of MLE to measurement error, The
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games
Simple Durable Goods Market*, A
Simple Durable Goods Model., A
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium.
Steady States and Determinacy in Economies with Infinitely Lived Agents
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
Superstition and Rational Learning
theory of learning in games, the
Trembling Invisible Hand Equilibrium
When are Agents Negligible?
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?
When is reputation bad?
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