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Person
ISNI: 
0000 0001 0910 5528
Name: 
Prescott, E. C.
Prescott, Edward
Prescott, Edward C.
Dates: 
1940-...
Creation class: 
article
cre
Language material
Text
txt
Creation role: 
author
contributor
editor
Related names: 
Bond, Philip
Davis, Douglas
Davis, Douglas D.
Davlin, Anne
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Goldstein, Itay
Janicki, Hubert P.
Jarque, Arantxa
Kehoe, Timothy J.
Korenok, Oleg
Lucas, Robert E. (1937-....))
MacGrattan, Ellen R.
Marshall, David A.
McGrattan, Ellen
McGrattan, Ellen R.
Mehra, Rajnish
Mueller, Rolf A.E.
Oleg, Korenok
Parente, Stephen L.
Piguillem, Facundo
Prescott, Edward
Prescott, Edward S.
PRESCOTT, EDWARD SIMPSON
Prescott, Ned
Price, David A.
Simpson Prescott, Edward
Slivinski, Stephen
Stokey, Nancy L.
Sumner, Daniel A.
Tatar, Daniel D.
TOWNSEND
Townsend, Robert M.
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Waddell, Sonya Ravindranath
Wallace, Neil
Weinberg, John A.
Titles: 
Auditing and bank capital regulation
Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties
Barriers to riches
Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?
Changes in the size distribution of U.S. banks: 1960-2005
Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard
Communication in Private-Information Models: Theory and Computation
Computing moral-hazard problems using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
Contingent capital: the trigger problem
Contractual arrangements for intertemporal trade
costs and benefits of bank supervisory disclosure, The
experimental analysis of contingent capital triggering mechanisms, An
Experimental Analysis of Contingent Capital with Market-Price Triggers, An
Experimenting with contingent capital triggers
Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information : technical appendix
Firms, assignments, and earnings
Group lending and financial intermediation: an example
Hired hooves: Transactions in a south Indian village factor market
Incentives, communication, and payment instruments
Introduction to the special issue on the Diamond-Dybvig model
Market-Based Corrective Actions
Market-based regulation and the informational content of prices
Means of payment, the unbanked, and EFT '99
Mechanism design and assignment models
Needed : A Theory of Total Factor Productivity
Openness, Technology Capital, and Development
Optimal bonuses and deferred pay for bank employees : implications of hidden actions with persistent effects in time
pre-commitment approach in a model of regulatory banking capital, The
primer on moral-hazard models, A
Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments-super-1
Providing Incentives for Mortgage Originators
Recursive methods in economic dynamics
regional look at the role of house prices and labor market conditions in mortgage default, A
Regulating bank capital structure to control risk
Should bank supervisors disclose information about their banks?
State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved action and unobserved characteristics
STATE-CONTINGENT BANK REGULATION WITH UNOBSERVED ACTIONAS AND UNOBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS
State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics
Technological design and moral hazard
Technology capital and the U.S. current account
Theory of the firm: applied mechanism design
Unmeasured investment and the puzzling U.S. boom in the 1990s
WHY DO AMERICANS WORK SO MUCH MORE THAN EUROPEANS?
Contributed to or performed: 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW -UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA OSAKA UNIVERSITY ETC-
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
Notes: 
Sources: 
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