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0000 0001 0915 5904
Brams, S. J.
Brams, Steven J.
Brams, Steven John
Brams, Streven J.
Affuso, Paul J.
Barbanel, J. B.
Barbanel, Julius B.
Brams, S. J.
Brams, Steven J
BRAMS, Steven J.
Davis, Morton D.
Doherty, Ann E.
Edelman, Paul H.
Eldelman, P. H.
Felsenthal, Dan S.
Fishburn, P. C.
Fishburn, Peter C.
Fishburn, Peter C. (1936- ))
Fishburn, Peter Clingermann
Fishburns, Peter C.
Franz, Alexandra D.
Hessel, Marek P.
Jones, Christopher B.
Jones, M. A.
Jones, Michael A.
Kaplan, Todd R
Kaplan, Todd R.
Kilgour, D Marc
Kilgour, D. M.
Kilgour, D. Marc
Kilgour, D. Mark
Kilgour, M. D.
Lucas, William F. (1933- ))
Merrill, Samuel III
Mor, Ben D.
Nagel, Jack H
Nagel, Jack H.
New York University
New York University Affiliation (see also from)
Potthoff, Richard F.
Roberts, Fred S.
Samuel Merrill, III
Steven, Brams J.
Straffin, Philip D.
Taylor, Alan D.
Taylor, Alan D. (1947- ))
Togman, Jeffrey M.
Weidner, Matthew L.
Zwicker, William S.
川越, 敏司 (1970-)
Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
Applied game theory proceedings of a conference at the Inst. for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 13 - 16, 1978
Applied game theory : proceedings of a conference at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 13-16, 1978
Approval Voting in Practice.
ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem.
Better ways to cut a cake revisited
Biblical games : a strategic analysis of stories in the Old Testament/ [by] Steven J. Brams.
Biblical games : game theory and the Hebrew Bible
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?, THE
Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond
Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power.
Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
Competitive Fair Division.
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
Cycles of Conflict
Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
Divide and conquer a proportional, minimal envy cake cutting procedure
Dividing the indivisible procedures for allocating cabinet ; ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system
Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition, The
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from iMathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures/i
Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm, An
Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
Fair division 07261 abstracts collection ; Dagstuhl seminar
Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
Fair Division and Politics
Fair Division by Point Allocation
Fair division Dagstuhl seminar 0726, June 24 - 29, 2007
Fair division : from cake-cutting to dispute resolution
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
Flow and form in the international system
Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
Game Theory and Emotions
Game Theory and Literature
Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
Game theory and national security
Game theory and politics
game theory and the humanities: bridging two worlds.
Game Theory : Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper
Games Theory and Literature
Generic Negotiation Game, A
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
Instability of Power Sharing, The
Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
Kōhei bunkatsu no hōsoku : Dare moga manzokusuru kyūkyoku no kōshōhō
Kyūyaku seisho no gēmu riron : Gēmu purēyā to shiteno kami
Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures
Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
mathematics of preference, choice, and order: essays in honor of peter c. fishburn., the
mathematics of preference, choice, and order, The : essays in honor of Peter C. Fishburn
Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
minimax procedure for electing committees, A
Minimax Procedure for Negotiationg Multilateral Treaties, A
Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
Modeling Free Choice in Games
modules in applied mathematics: political and related models
Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem, A
N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
nail-biting election, A
Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
National Security Games
Negotiation games : applying game theory to bargaining and arbitration
New Chairman Paradoxes
normative turn in public choice, The
note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share, A
note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share, A
Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions, The
paradox of multiple elections, The
Paradoxes in politics : an introduction to the nonobvious in political science
Paradoxes of Fair Division
Path to Stable Deterrence, The
Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability, The
Political and related models
Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
presidencial election game, The
presidential election game., the
Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Probability of Nuclear War, The
Procedure for Divorce Settlements, A
Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Rational politics : decisions, games, and strategy
Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves, The
Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
Response to Rabow
Response to Randall Stone : Heresy or Scientific Progress?
Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, The
Satisfaction approval voting
Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
Sequential Arbitration Procedures.
Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, A
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
solución ganar-ganar, La : cómo garantizar que cada uno se queda la parte que le corresponde
solución ganar-ganar, La : una nueva técnica de negociación
Spatial models of election competition
Stabilizing Power Sharing
Superior beings if they exist, how would we know? ; Game-theoret. implications of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality and incomprehensibility
Superior beings : if they exist, how would we know : game-theoretic implications of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility
Superpower games : applying game theory to superpower conflict
Teoría de juegos y seguridad nacional
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Threat Power in Sequential Games
Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize : Catch 22s in International Crises
Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, The
UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, The
Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
When does approval voting make the "right choices"?
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
win--win solution, 1999:, The
win-win solution: guaranteeing fair shares to everybody., the
win--win solution, The : guaranteeing fair shares to everybody
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
公平分割の法則 : 誰もが満足する究極の交涉法
旧約聖書のゲーム理論 : ゲーム・プレーヤーとしての神
Contributed to or performed:
ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORTS- CV STARR CENTER FOR APPLIED ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING
RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY