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Brams, S. J.
Brams, Steven J.
Brams, Steven John
Brams, Streven J.
Affuso, Paul J.
Barbanel, J. B.
Barbanel, Julius B.
Brams, S. J.
Brams, Steven J
BRAMS, Steven J.
Davis, Morton D.
Doherty, Ann E.
Edelman, Paul H.
Eldelman, P. H.
Felsenthal, Dan S.
Fishburn, P. C.
Fishburn, Peter C.
Fishburn, Peter C. (1936- ))
Fishburn, Peter Clingermann
Fishburns, Peter C.
Franz, Alexandra D.
Gehrlein, William V.
Hessel, Marek P.
Jones, Christopher B.
Jones, M. A.
Jones, Michael A.
Kaplan, Todd R
Kaplan, Todd R.
Kilgour, D Marc
Kilgour, D. M.
Kilgour, D. Marc
Kilgour, D. Mark
Kilgour, M. D.
Lucas, William F. (1933-)
Merrill, Samuel III
Mor, Ben D.
Nagel, Jack H
Nagel, Jack H.
New York University
New York University Affiliation (see also from)
Potthoff, Richard F.
Roberts, Fred S. (1943-...)
Samuel Merrill, III
Steven, Brams J.
Straffin, Philip D. Jr
Taylor, Alan D.
Taylor, Alan D. (1947-)
Togman, Jeffrey M.
Weidner, Matthew L.
Zwicker, William S.
川越, 敏司 (1970-)
Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
Applied game theory : proceedings of a conference at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 13-16, 1978
Approval Voting in Practice.
ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem.
Better ways to cut a cake revisited
Biblical games: a strategic analysis of stories in the Old Testament
Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?, THE
Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond
Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power.
Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
Competitive Fair Division.
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
Cycles of Conflict
Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
Deterrence and uncertainty : a game-theoretic analysis
Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
Divide and conquer a proportional, minimal envy cake cutting procedure
Dividing the indivisible procedures for allocating cabinet ; ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system
Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition, The
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from iMathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures/i
Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm, An
Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
Fair Division and Politics
Fair Division by Point Allocation
Fair division Dagstuhl seminar 0726, June 24 - 29, 2007
Fair division from cake-cutting to dispute resolution
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
Flow and form in the international system
Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
Game Theory and Emotions
Game Theory and Literature
Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
Game theory and politics
Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds
Game theory & national security
Game Theory : Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper
Games Theory and Literature
Generic Negotiation Game, A
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
Instability of Power Sharing, The
Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
Kōhei bunkatsu no hōsoku : Dare moga manzokusuru kyūkyoku no kōshōhō
Kyūyaku seisho no gēmu riron : Gēmu purēyā to shiteno kami
Luther à Ostervald, De : les traductions protestantes de la Bible en langues allemande, française et néerlandaise du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle
Mathematics and democracy designing better voting and fair-division procedures
Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
mathematics of preference, choice and order essays in honor of Peter C. Fishburn, The
Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
minimax procedure for electing committees, A
Minimax Procedure for Negotiationg Multilateral Treaties, A
Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
Modeling Free Choice in Games
Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem, A
N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
nail-biting election, A
Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
National Security Games
Negotiation games : applying game theory to bargaining and arbitration
New Chairman Paradoxes
normative turn in public choice, The
note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share, A
note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share, A
Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions, The
paradox of multiple elections, The
Paradoxes in politics : an introduction to the nonobvious in political science
Paradoxes of Fair Division
Path to Stable Deterrence, The
Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability, The
Political and related models
Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
presidential election game, The
Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Probability of Nuclear War, The
Procedure for Divorce Settlements, A
Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Rational politics : decisions, games, and strategy
Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves, The
Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
Response to Rabow
Response to Randall Stone : Heresy or Scientific Progress?
Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, The
Satisfaction approval voting
Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
Sequential Arbitration Procedures.
Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, A
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
solución ganar-ganar, La : cómo garantizar que cada uno se queda la parte que le corresponde
solución ganar-ganar, La : una nueva técnica de negociación
Spatial models of election competition
Stabilizing Power Sharing
Superior beings : if they exist, how would we know? : game-theoretic implications of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility
Teoría de juegos y seguridad nacional
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Threat Power in Sequential Games
Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize : Catch 22s in International Crises
Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, The
UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, The
Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
When does approval voting make the "right choices"?
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
win-win solution. -, The
Winding down if preemption or escalation occurs : a game-theoretic analysis
Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
公平分割の法則 : 誰もが満足する究極の交涉法
旧約聖書のゲーム理論 : ゲーム・プレーヤーとしての神
Contributed to or performed:
ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORTS- CV STARR CENTER FOR APPLIED ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING
RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY