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0000 0001 1073 1817
writer of accompanying material
Fishburn, Peter C
Fishburn, Peter C.
Kornhauser, Lewis A.
Kuhn, Harold William (1925-....))
Morgenstern, Oskar (1902-1977))
New York University (NYU) / Department of Economics
Ordover, Janusz A
Ordover, Janusz A.
Osborne, Martin J
Osborne, Martin J.
Tel Aviv University / Eitan Berglas School of Economics
University of British Columbia. Department of Economics
Yaari, Menahem E.
11-20 Money Request Game: Evaluating the Upper Bound of k-Level Reasoning, The
A,A,A,A,A or A,A,B,C,D? Over-Diversification in Repeated Decision Problems.
("A", "f"): Choice with Frames
Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses., The
Aggregation of equivalence relations
Algebraic aggregation theory
Bargaining and Markets
Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences., A
Choice from Lists
Choice of Conjectures In A Bargaining Game With Incomplete Information, The
Choice problems with a 'reference' point
Choosing the two finalists
Colonel Blotto’s Top Secret Files
Comment on the Logic of 'Agreeing to Disagree' Type Results, A
Comments on Neuroeconomics
Comments on the interpretation of game theory (Now published in Econometrica, 59 (1991), pp.909-924.)
Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behaviour: An Introduction (Now published in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: John Robinson and Beyond, edited by G. Feiwel, (1989), pp.243-25.)
Competitive Stock Market as Cartel Maker: Some Examples, The
Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction (Now published in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (eds.), (Macmillan Press, 1987), pp.17-32.), The
Correct Belief, Wrong Action and a Puzzling Gender Difference.
course in game theory, A
curse of wealth and power, The
Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules.
Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), pp.63-78.)
Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome.
Definable Preferences: An Example.
Definable preferences: An example1
Defineable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town)
Dilemas de un teórico económico
Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
Discussion of 'BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS'
Economics and Language
"Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting
Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: Framing effects in repeated matching pennies games
Edgar Allen Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game?
Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge.", The
Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets
Equilibrium in a Market With Sequential Bargaining (Now published in Econometrica 53 (1985), pp. 1133-1150.)
Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
Equilibrium in the Jungle
Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device
Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device
Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game, An
Fairness Motivations and Procedures of Choice between Lotteries as Revealed through Eye Movements
Finite Automata Play A Repeated Extensive Game.
Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma
Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, No.39 (1986),pp.176-188.)
Game with Almost Common Knowledge: An Example (Now published in American Economic Review, 79 (1989), pp.385-391.), A
Games with Procedurally Rational Players.
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study
Irrational diversification in multiple decision problems
Is it "Economics and Psychology"?: the Case of Hyperbolic Discounting.
John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling.
Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent
Luxury Prices: An Expository Note
model of choice from lists, A
Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules, A
Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent, A
Modeling Bounded Rationality
Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns
Modelling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognise Equilibrium Patterns
Money pumps in the market.
Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
Naive Strategies in Competitive Games.
Naive Strategies in Zero-Sum Games.
Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (Now published in Rand Journal of Economics, vol.17 (1986), pp.176-188.), The
Noncooperative models of bargaining
Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule., A
note on the duty of disclosure, A
On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment
On Bargaining, Settling, and Litigation: A Problem in Multistage Games With Imperfect Information
On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model.
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall.
On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences.
On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining.
On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons
On the logic of "agreeing to disagree" type results
On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach
On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (Now published in Econometrica, vol.50, (1982), pp. 97-100.)
Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability.
Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales
Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games, A
Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games
Remarks on the Logic of Agreeing to Disagree Type Results (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), pp.184-193.)
Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences.
Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
Reputation and Patience in the “War of Attrition”
Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games., A
Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting
Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics, A
Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information., A
Similarity and decision-making under risk (is there a utility theory resolution to the Allais paradox?)
Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), pp.145-153.)
Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, A
Simplicity of Solution Concepts: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Extensive Games v.s. Iteratively undominated Strategies in Normal games.
Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach., The
Single Profile Analogues to Multi- Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logics Approach (Now published in International Economic Review, (1984) pp.719-730.), The
Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference
Stability of decision systems under majority rule
Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata (Now published in Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp.1259-1282.), The
study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach, A
theorist's view of experiments, A
Tracking Decision Makers under Uncertainty
Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference
Two Tales of Power and Distribution of Wealth in the Jungle
What Motives Should Guide Referees? On The Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
What Motives Should Guide Referees? On the Design of Mechanisms to Elict Options.
Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
Why Are Linear Orderings so Common in Natural Language?
Contributed to or performed:
ECONOMETRICA -EVANSTON ILL-