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ISNI: 
0000 0001 1081 7290
Name: 
Rot, Ėlvin
Roth, A. E.
Roth, Al
Roth, Alvin
Roth, Alvin E.
Roth, Alvin Eliot
Dates: 
1951-
Creation class: 
article
cre
Language material
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txt
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author
contributor
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Related names: 
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila
Ãœnver, M. Utku
Ariely, Dan
Ashlagi, Itai
Avery, Christopher
Bereby-Meyer, Yoella
Blum, Yosef
Cambridge University Press
Cawley, John
Coles, Peter
Coles, Peter Andrew
Cooper, David
Er’ev, I.
Erev, Ido
Ert, Eyal
Feltovich, Nick
Fréchette, Guillaume
Frechette, Guillaume
Gamarnik, David
Gneezy, Uri
Graduate School of Business Affiliation (see also from)
Grosskopf, Brit
Haruvy, Ernan
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration Affiliation (see also from)
Harvard University / Department of Economics
Harvard University / Harvard Business School / Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
Harvard University Department of Economics Affiliation (see also from)
Hau, Robin
Heinrich, Carolyn J.
Hertwig, Ralph
Jolls, Christine
Kagel, John H
Kagel, John H.
Kagel, John H. (1942-)
Kagel, John Henry (1942-)
Katok, Elena
Kessler, Judd B.
Kojima, Fuhito
Leider, Stephen
Levine, Phillip B.
Malouf, Michael W. K.
McKinney, C. Nicholas
Mongell, Susan
Mongell, Susan J.
Mueser, Peter R.
Murnigham, J.K.
Murnighan, J K
Murnighan, J Keith
Murnighan, J. Keith
National Bureau of Economic Research
National Bureau of Economic Research Affiliation (see also from)
Niederle, Muriel
Ochs, J.
Ochs, Jack
Ockenfels, Axel
Okuno-Fujiwara, M.
Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro
Oliveira Sotomayor, Marilda A.
Pathak, Parag
Pathak, Parag A
Pathak, Parag A.
Peranson, Elliott
Posner, Richard
Posner, Richard A
Posner, Richard A.
Postlewaite, Andrew
Prasnikar, V.
Prasnikar, Vesna
Rees, Michael A.
Roth, A.
Roth, A.E.
Roth, Alvin
Roth, Alvin E
Roth, Alvin E.
Roth, AlvinE.
Roth, Alvn E.
Rothblum, Uriel G
Rothblum, Uriel G.
Sönmez, Tayfun
Schoumaker, F.
Schoumaker, Françoise
Slonim, Robert
Slonim, Robert L.
Sönmez, Tayfun
Sotomayor, Marilda
Sotomayor, Marilda A. Oliveira
Stanford University Department of Economics Affiliation (see also from)
Troske, Kenneth R.
Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques
University of Illinois Affiliation (see also from)
Ünver, M. Utku
Unver, M.Utku
Utku Unver, M.
Vande Vate, John H
Xing, Xiaolin
Titles: 
Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative "Dutch" Auctions
axiomatic models of bargaining, lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems
Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study
Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study.
Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game
Boston Public School Match, The
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
Choice Prediction Competition: Choices From Experience and From Description, A
Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction, A
Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction, A
collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare), The
college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem, The
College Admissions Problem Revisited., The
Common and conflicting interests in two-sided matching markets
Considerations of fairness and strategy: experimental data from sequential games
Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence., The
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market, The
Dynamics Of Reorganization In Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated By A Natural Experiment, The
Early History of Experimental Economics, The
Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics, The
. edited with j.h. kagel. princeton university press.* 2001.
. (editor) cambridge university press.* 1990.
. (editor) cambridge university press. (chinese translation, 2008)* 1988.
effect of adding a constant to all payoffs: experimental investigation, and implications for reinforcement learning models, The
effects of a centralized clearinghouse on job placement, wages, and hiring practices, The
Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three-Person Game, The
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
Efficient kidney exchange: coincidence of wants in a structured market
Erev, I. emet al/em. A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction. emGames/em 2010, em1/em, 117-136
Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory., The
Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study.
experimental analysis of ending rules in internet auctions, An
experimental study of sequential bargaining, An
Form and function in experimental design
game-theoretic models of bargaining, (editor)cambridge university press, 1985.* 1987.
Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics.
Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?, The
handbook of experimental economics, 1995;, The
handbook of market design, The
If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective, The
Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions.
Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England, A
Kidneys For Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview.
Laboratory experimentation in economics six points of view
Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second price auctions evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet
Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions theory and evidence from a natural experiment on the internet
Late and multiple bidding in second price internet auctions theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games
Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Run
Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
Learning in High stakes utlimatum and market games. An experiment in the Slovak Republic
Lets Keep the Con out of Experimental Econ.: A Methodological Note.
Making Markets Thick: Designing Rules for Offers and Acceptances
Market culture: how norms governing exploding offers affect market performance
Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, The
Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining., The
Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom., A
Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange, The
New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange
New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, The
New York City High School Match, The
note on job matching with budget constraints, A
Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining., A
Note---Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Some Further Comments
On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets.
On the Non-transferable Utility Value: A Reply [Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts].
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
Pairwise kidney exchange
Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria.
Predictive value and the usefulness of game theoretic models
Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem.
¿Qué hemos aprendido del diseño de mercados?
Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching.
redesign of the matching market for American physicians some engineering aspects of economic design, The
Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games
Repugnance as a constraint on markets
Risk aversion and bargaining * : Some preliminary results
Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes.
Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining.
Risk aversion in bargaining : an experimental study
Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study., The
Role of Temporary Help Employment in Low-Wage Worker Advancement, The
rule of information in bargaining: an experimental study, The
Scale changes and shared information in bargaining: An experimental study
Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility., The
Shapley value essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, The
Sociological versus strategic factors in bargaining
Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism.
Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation, The
Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching.
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the New York City High School match
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redisigning the NYC High School Match
Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment.
timing of bids in Internet auctions market design, bidder behavior, and artificial agents, The
Toward a theory of bargaining: an experimental study in economics
Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants
Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists.
Two-sided matching a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match
Unraveling reduces the scope of an entry level labor market gastroenterology with and without a centralized match
Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: an experimental investigation
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matching: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post- Season College Football Bowls
Utility functions for simple games
Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets
Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts.
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
What have we learned from market design?
. with marilda sotomayor. cambridge university press.* 1995.
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