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0000 0001 1681 1973
Myerson, R. B.
Myerson, Roger B.
Myerson, Roger Bruce
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Baron, David P
Baron, David P.
Harvard University Press
Jeffrey, Banks S.
Maskin, Eric S.
Morton, Rebecca B.
Myerson, R B
Myerson, Roger B
Myerson, Roger B.
Pollock, Gregory B.
Roger, Myerson B.
Satterthwaite, Mark A.
Stiglitz, Joseph Eugene
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
University of Chicago / Department of Economics
Weber, Robert J.
Wilson, Charles A.
Wilson, Robert B.
Winter, Sidney G. (1935-....))
Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria.
Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy, An
Allocation, information and markets
Analysis of Democratic Institutions : Structure, Conduct and Performance
Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption
Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability, An
Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory
Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption:
Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-way, Experimental Elections
Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters
Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights
Capitalist investment and political liberalization
Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information"
Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility
Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games
Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information
Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections
Dual Reduction and Elementary Games
Dynamic Matching Problems With Incentive Constraints
dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations, A
Economic Analysis of Constitutions
Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction
Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion.
Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information.
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria., An
Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories., An
Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections., An
Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Therorem, An
Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory
Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective
Fundamental theory of institutions : a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz
Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory
Game-theoretic Consistency and International Relations
Game-Theoretic Models of Politics
Game theory : analysis of conflict
General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information, A
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem.
Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems
Informational origins of political bias towards critical groups of voters
Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson
Introduction to Game Theory, An
John Nash's Contribution to Economics
Large Poisson Games
Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict
Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi
Linear Functionals of Convex Sets with Applications to Economics
Linearity, Concavity, and Scale Invariance in Social Choice Functions
Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization
macroeconomic model of Russian transition, A
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal.
Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles, A
Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents
Multistage Games with Communication.
Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory
Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview
Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment
OLIGARCHIC PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA
Optimal Auction Design
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory
Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster
Population uncertainty and Poisson games
Population uncertainty in contests
Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model
Probability models for economic decisions
Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection
Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems
Theory of Voting Equilibria, A
Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility.
Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation
Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information.
Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems.
Value of Games in Partition Function Form
Values of Games Without Sidepayments
Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
Viscous population equilibria
Contributed to or performed:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW